If the question is “who does São Paulo owe?”, the answer does not fit in a single bank, businessman or club. At the end of 2025, the management report separated R$1.067 billion in gross obligations and R$209.2 million in net rights. The difference between the two blocks produced the figure of R$858.2 million that the club itself presented as debt.
This detail changes the reading. Debt fell by R$110 million compared to the R$968.3 million restated in 2024, but gross obligations did not fall: they went from R$1.012 billion to R$1.067 billion. The improvement came because net rights grew much more, from R$43.8 million to R$209.2 million. In other words, the net account improved without a widespread payment of commitments.
The numbers used in this anatomy are those of December 31, 2025, the last complete annual balance available in the São Paulo transparency area. Specific balances continue to change throughout 2026, but the annual closing allows us to see what nature the liabilities are and where the FIDC actually comes into play.
The debt of R$858 million is a net account
When fans see a “debt of R$858 million”, it is easy to imagine a list of bills that, when added together, reach exactly that amount. This is not how the management report constructs the indicator.
The club is part of a bond block worth R$1.067 billion. Then, this value is offset by R$209.2 million in net rights, made up of cash and investments, accounts receivable and other credits, discounting revenues that still need to be appropriated throughout the contracts. The result is net debt of R$858.2 million.
Therefore, two sentences can be true at the same time: net debt fell and total gross obligations increased. This is the first difference between debt reduction and simple debt payment.
Who did São Paulo owe at the end of 2025
Banks and other financial institutions
The largest single block was financial. São Paulo recorded R$277.7 million in obligations with financial institutions, against R$259.3 million at the restated closing of 2024. The balance sheet details operations with Banco Bradesco, Banco Daycoval and Banco Rendimento, in addition to a short-term guaranteed account.
Most of this balance was still concentrated in the short term: R$195.9 million appeared as current and R$81.7 million as non-current. The explanatory notes say that the loans were mainly used as working capital and had guarantees linked to broadcasting rights, brand licensing, receivables from athletes, provision of spaces and association contributions.
This data is important to understand the FIDC. The operation precisely sought to reduce dependence on expensive and short bank credit, but the bank balance in December 2025 ended up higher than that in December 2024. This does not make the fund irrelevant; shows that the restructuring did not eliminate the need for new funding during the year.
Taxes and installments
The second large block was tax. The administration report grouped R$234.8 million in tax obligations and installments. In the previous year, it was R$259.4 million.
The balance sheet informs that, in 2025, the club formalized a tax transaction with the Attorney General's Office of the National Treasury to consolidate federal debts already paid in installments and registered as active debt. According to management, the transaction reduced tax liabilities and established a new payment schedule.
This effect needs to be separated from FIDC. Part of the improvement in the debt profile came from its own fiscal negotiation, with different terms and conditions, and not from the credit rights fund.
Clubs, athletes’ and intermediaries’ rights
São Paulo recorded R$ 163.4 million in the “clubs/intermediations” group. In the balance sheet, this block appears in more detail between federal and economic rights payable and intermediations or participation in economic rights.
In practice, these are commitments related to the activity that most attracts the fan's attention: purchasing and negotiating players, installments of economic rights and amounts owed to intermediaries. The consolidated balance was very close to the previous year, when it was R$164.9 million.
This helps to explain why news about charges from other clubs or agents do not represent a debt “separate” from São Paulo’s financial problem. They are concrete manifestations of a category that already appears in the club's liabilities, although the value and specific creditor may vary after the balance sheet date.
Labor obligations, image rights and agreements
Another relevant block totaled R$118.3 million in labor obligations and image rights, compared to R$94 million in 2024. In addition, the report presented R$80.3 million in labor and civil agreements.
These two lines show that liabilities are not restricted to loans or transfers. Salaries, charges, image rights, agreements and processes also consume cash and can put pressure on the short term. At the end of 2025, the administration recorded R$80.3 million to be paid in labor agreements and civil proceedings.
Advances, suppliers and contingencies
Contract advances totaled R$150.7 million. Suppliers accounted for R$19.3 million and provisions for contingencies accounted for R$23 million.
They are different natures. Advances reflect contracts in which amounts were received or recognized in advance and still generate future obligations; suppliers represent purchased goods and services; contingencies record estimated risks of processes and other events. Added to the other groups, they complete the picture of gross obligations of R$ 1.067 billion.
What is São Paulo's FIDC in practice
The FIDC is not an investor that gives money to the club without compensation and it is also not a debt forgiveness program. It is a structure for anticipating receivables: the fund acquires eligible credit rights from São Paulo, transforms future revenues into present cash and remunerates investors according to predefined rules.
In the management report released in the club's transparency area, OutField described a total senior fundraising of R$ 240 million, with CDI cost plus 5% per year for São Paulo. By September 2025, R$135 million had been paid in and placed in the club's cash flow, while R$105 million remained committed for future releases, conditioned on the presentation of new eligible receivables.
The report states that the resources already released were used both for operational commitments and to reduce past debts. It also informs that around R$39 million had already been returned to investors at that time.
São Paulo is the only shareholder in the subordinate class. In the 2025 statements, the club recorded R$86.6 million in bonds and securities linked to quotas and showed that it had transferred credit rights from contracts, including sponsorships and association contributions, to the fund.
Did the FIDC exchange one debt for another?
In part, the question makes sense, but “debt exchange” is an oversimplification. The fund anticipates future revenue that the club would receive and creates an economic obligation to remunerate and amortize investors. At the same time, cash up front can pay off expensive debts, lengthen your financial profile and reduce the need for one-off bank loans.
The difference is in the design. Previously, São Paulo frequently resorted to short operations, offering specific contracts as guarantee and renegotiating cash in small cycles. The FIDC created a permanent structure, with rules for eligible receivables, previously established cost and governance mechanisms.
There is, however, a clear economic price: a part of future revenues no longer reaches the cash flow freely because it was assigned or linked to the operation. Therefore, the benefit depends on the club using the money upfront to reduce more expensive liabilities while controlling spending that could recreate debt.
What the FIDC really changed
Cheaper and organized part of the financing
The OutField report shows that, in May 2025, bank debt had fallen to R$215.9 million, approximately 17% below the R$259.3 million in December 2024. At that time, the structure was fulfilling one of its functions: using anticipated receivables to reduce onerous bank debt.
The report itself, however, records that the club took out R$50.6 million in financing from Banco Daycoval in the first half of the year. The operation required approval from the fund's credit committee because one of the covenants limits new debts above R$10 million accumulated in the same quarter without prior authorization.
This episode sums up the change well: the FIDC did not completely prohibit new debts, but began to impose an additional layer of control and approval over a relevant part of financial decisions.
Did not produce a linear fall in bank debt
May's photo was not the same as December's. In the audited balance sheet as of December 31, 2025, obligations with financial institutions reached R$277.7 million, up from R$259.3 million in the previous year.
This shows why it is not correct to take the 17% reduction announced in the first half of the year and treat it as a definitive result for the year. The club continued to need working capital and carried out new operations. The FIDC changed the cost, cash source, term and governance of part of the financing, but did not end dependence on bank credit.
The reduction of R$110 million came mainly from the rights side
The most enlightening data from the management report is the bridge between 2024 and 2025. The debt started at R$968.3 million. Net rights increased by R$165.4 million, while obligations increased by R$55.3 million. The net effect of these two forces took the indicator to R$858.2 million.
Therefore, the drop of approximately R$110 million does not mean that the club paid out R$110 million more than it contracted. It means that, in the metric used by São Paulo, the improvement in assets and receivables was greater than the increase in obligations.
This growth in rights was linked to a strong expansion in accounts receivable. The balance sheet shows R$1.431 billion in accounts receivable at the end of 2025, compared to R$763.8 million in 2024. At the same time, there was R$1.387 billion in revenue to be appropriated, which greatly reduces the net value considered in the debt account.
So the FIDC reduced or just reprofiled the debt?
Both things can happen within the same operation, but the 2025 numbers favor a more careful conclusion: the FIDC was mainly a financing and restructuring tool, capable of bringing forward cash, amortizing selected liabilities, reducing costs in certain operations and imposing governance rules. It was not a discharge of São Paulo's liabilities.
There was an effective reduction in some debts along the way, especially when the anticipated cash was directed to previous obligations. There was also a temporary improvement in bank debt in the first half of the year. But the bank balance rose again by December, and several other categories of bonds grew.
The reduction in total debt in 2025 depended on a larger set of factors: an increase in receivables, sales and contracts, tax transactions, cash management, use of FIDC and new funding. Attributing the entire R$110 million decline to the fund erases precisely the most important part of the year's financial history.
An important accounting detail in comparison with 2024
The 2025 statements restated the 2024 numbers because the club changed the accounting treatment of the FIDC. The administration concluded that São Paulo does not control the fund: despite holding subordinated shares, it does not have decision-making power over the relevant activities, which are the responsibility of the fiduciary administrator within the regulations.
For this reason, the FIDC was no longer consolidated as if it were controlled by the club and began to appear only through the equity position of the shares held. To compare 2024 with 2025, the correct thing to do is to use the numbers restated in the most recent balance sheet, and not mix the old closing with the new methodology.
The auditors' report also came out with a qualified opinion on another topic: withdrawals from bank accounts whose nature, purpose and supporting documentation were not fully available for examination. The reservation does not automatically transform each debt line into invalid data, but it is a relevant limitation on the quality of the financial documentation for that year and deserves to be known by those who use the balance sheet as a source.
How to know if the restructuring is working in the next balance sheets
The main test is not just to observe whether the “total debt” number has fallen. It is necessary to monitor whether gross obligations decrease, whether financial costs fall, whether maturities are no longer concentrated in the short term and whether the club reduces the need to anticipate new revenue to pay current expenses.
It is also important to check the quality of the rights used to offset the debt. Accounts receivable help the financial position, but are not equivalent to cash already on hand. When part of these receivables is linked to the FIDC, the reading needs to consider how much of the future flow is already committed to investors.
The picture for 2025, therefore, is one of improvement in the net indicator, but not of resolved debt. São Paulo ended the year in debt to banks, tax authorities, clubs, intermediaries, athletes, workers, suppliers and other parties. The FIDC created a more structured tool to manage part of this liability; The challenge remains to transform this tool into a lasting reduction of obligations, and not just another way to get through the next cash crunch.
